I went to LA in December of 2016 to write this paper. After spending four months working in an unproductive direction and receiving instructions to go back to the drawing board, my colleague Ameen Soleimani became interested in the stake-based challenge system proposed in a pre-release draft of the Aventus whitepaper he had a copy of. We expanded this idea, filled in gaps, and created in the AdChain Registry design the immediate predecessor to token-curated registries.
Following the completion of the AdChain whitepaper, the authors began to discuss other potential applications of the system. In the weeks following we entertained several ideas that left us increasingly curious as to the system's complete potential. After discussing the AdChain paper in depth with Karl Floersch and discovering he had designed very similar system (never implemented) for the Ujo project in September of 2016, the lightbulb went off as to the underlying system's genericity. At the urging of James Young, I wrote Token-Curated Registries 1.0. Token-curated registries are cryptosystems for decentrally curating lists, with intrinsic economic incentives for token holders to curate the list's contents judiciously.
This very concise paper describes a generalized dispute resolution system backed by a token-curated registry. The system itself is quite nice, but it also contains an idea I find quite interesting: stake pools of undefined size that defer subjectivity regarding suitability to the user. Mark Beylin did most of the original thinking for this paper, but I like to think I was a useful sounding board for bouncing his ideas off of.
This "small but mighty" update to the original TCR paper added the MINORITY_BLOC_SLASH parameter, which is a lever to mitigate an undesirable behavior called vote splitting that emerged in 1.0 TCRs.